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Abstract
In Portugal duration of beneﬁts is exclusively age determined while replacement rates
are to all intents and purposes uniform. We exploit diﬀerences in potential maximum du-
ration of beneﬁts for nearly matched pairs of individuals who diﬀer in age by one year and
in potential maximun duration of beneﬁts by three months. In speciﬁcations that take ac-
count of unobserved individual heterogeneity, while controlling for pure age eﬀects on escape
rates, we ﬁnd that lower maximum beneﬁt duration is associated with substantially higher
quarterly rates of job ﬁnding in the range 53 to 106 percent.
Keywords: Unemployment beneﬁts, unemployment duration, job search
JEL codes: J64, J65.
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In this paper we investigate the disincentive eﬀects of the Portuguese unemploy-
ment insurance system. Since replacement rates are near uniform we shall in-
vestigate the eﬀects of beneﬁt receipt and potential duration of unemployment
insurance (UI) beneﬁts. There are a number of papers charting the eﬀects of ben-
eﬁt duration on joblessness that complement the replacement rate literature and
generally report much stronger disincentive eﬀects.1
Theory suggests that putting a limit on beneﬁt duration will tend to accel-
erate job search and that beneﬁt exhaustion will produce spike in escape rates
Mortensen, 1977). The early empirical literature conﬁrmed both predictions,
namely, the reduction in escape rates/increase jobless duration with extended ben-
eﬁts (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1990) and the sharp increase in escape rates
at beneﬁt expiration (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Carling, Edin, Harkman, and Holm-
lund. 1996).
Such studies exploit changes in UI rules over time. However, an enduring con-
cern has been endogenous policy bias, as will arise when more generous UI rules
are introduced in anticipation of a deteriorating labor market. More recent stud-
ies therefore have either sought to identify legal changes in beneﬁt duration that
occur independently of labor market conditions (Card and Levine, 2000; Lalive
and Zweim¨ uller, 2004) or to exploit changes in the law that aﬀect several cate-
gories of (treated) unemployed workers diﬀerently (with no change in beneﬁts for
another group of controls) for a reasonably long panel of data (Lalive, van Ours,
Zweim¨ uller, 2006; van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). The results are again con-
sistent with (job search) theory and are economically and statistically signiﬁcant
particularly for beneﬁt duration where stronger disincentive eﬀects are observed.
Here we deploy a methodology close to a regression discontinuity analysis to
identify the impact of unemployment beneﬁts on transition rates from unemploy-
ment into employment. We rely for traction on the fact that maximum duration
1On the cross-section replacement rate literature, see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; and, for more recent
studies seeking to identify disincentive eﬀects from regime changes, see inter al. Carling, Holmlund, and Vejsiu,
2001; Rød and Zhang, 2003.
1of beneﬁts in Portugal is exclusively a function of age. Maximum potential ben-
eﬁt duration basically increases by 3 months at ﬁve-year age intervals. Focusing
on paired sets of individuals on either side of each age-entitlement divide - who
diﬀer by just one year of age - we oﬀer a treatment eﬀect analysis of the impact
of three-month increases in the maximum duration of beneﬁts on transitions into
employment. Our approach relies on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework for eval-
uating disincentive eﬀects. That is, we will obtain estimates of the diﬀerence in
transition rates among younger and slightly older individuals (the ﬁrst diﬀerence)
for unemployment recipients and non-recipients (the second diﬀerence).
To anticipate our ﬁndings, we ﬁrst report strong evidence of disincentive eﬀects
using a discrete duration (complementary log-log) model. These eﬀects persist
after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity using a ﬁnite mixture
distribution approach (viz. a two-mass point hazard model). We further report
that our results on heterogeneity are consistent with a more parsimonious split-
population model in whicha sizeableproportion of the unemployedis neverallowed
to exit joblessness. At all times, we control for the independent eﬀects of age on
escape rates, which are found to be monotonic and well determined.
2D a t a
Our data are taken from the nationally representative Portuguese Quarterly Em-
ployment Surveys for the period 1992(2) to 1997(4). The choice of starting and
ending date is dictated by changes in the methodology of the employment sur-
vey, including new sampling procedures and redeﬁnition of the key unemployment
variable, respectively. The survey has a quasi-longitudinal capacity: we have in-
formation on the length of the current unemployment spell (in months), and with
one-sixth of the sample rotating out of the survey each quarter we can track tran-
sitions from unemployment into employment for up to ﬁve quarters.
Each survey contains information on the unemployment beneﬁt status of the
unemployed worker. It does not contain information on replacement rates. How-
ever, the UI replacement rate is in general a constant proportion (65 percent) of
2the previous wage.2 For this reason, our focus will be upon the role of potential
beneﬁt duration. Under Portuguese law, duration of beneﬁts is purely age deter-
mined. The maximum duration of beneﬁts is 10 months for those aged less than
25 years and 12 months for those aged between 25 and 29 years. It then rises
in 3-month intervals for each incremental 5 years of age up to a maximun of 30
months at 55 years of age. We note parenthetically that duration entitlements did
not change over the sample period.
We exploit this purely age-determined system of beneﬁt entitlements in the
present paper to determine the eﬀects of beneﬁt duration on escape rates from
unemployment into employment by focusing on those age-adjacent - and hence
roughly matched individuals - whose beneﬁts diﬀer by three months (actually 2
months in the case of those aged 24 to 25 years). Our sample thus comprises only
t h o s ep a i r so fi n d i v i d u a l sa g e d2 4t o2 5y e a r s ,2 9t o3 0y e a r s ,3 4t o3 5y e a r s ,3 9t o
40 years, 44 to 45 years, 49 to 50 years, and 54 to 55 years. The variable YOUNG
will simply identify younger individuals in each age pair - irrespectiveof whether or
not they draw beneﬁts - the omitted category being those aged one year more. In
other words, YOUNG takes the value of one whenever individuals are aged 24, 29,
34, 39, 44, 49, and 54 years. It will further be interacted with a receipt of beneﬁts
dummy to evaluate the disincentive eﬀects of UI. Moreover, given well-known age
eﬀects on escape rates, we will also use six age dummies to determine the pure
eﬀect of age on escape rates/jobless duration. Here individuals aged 24 to 25 years
will now constitute the omitted category, meaning that the ﬁrst age dummy will be
one for individuals aged 29 or 30 years, while the second age dummy will identify
individuals aged 34 and 35, and so on. To estimate the discrete duration model we
rely on episode-splitting along the lines proposed by Jenkins (1995). This approach
implies that each spell of unemployment is transformed into a monthly series of
binary indicators, identifying censored and exit times.
Finally, reﬂecting well-documented diﬀerences between the sexes in labor sup-
2Nevertheless, the 65 percent rule cannot yield less than the minimum wage for low-wage earners or more than
three times the minimum wage for high-wage earners. Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain information
on the previous wage of unemployed workers that would allow us to calculate replacement rates for these groups.
3ply, we restricted the sample to males. We also required that the individual be
unemployed at the time of the survey, be aged between 16 and 64 years, and be
resident in mainland Portugal.
3 Model speciﬁcation
3.1 The complementary log-log model
In our exercise, duration is measured in months. Conventional continuous time
duration models are clearly at odds with our data. We thus consider a simple
discrete time duration model: the complementarylog-log (cloglog) model. Let time
be divided into k intervals [τ0,τ 1), [τ1,τ 2) ...[τk−1,∞). The researcher observes
discrete time T ∈{ 1,...,k},w h e r eT = t denotes an exit within the interval
[τt−1,τ t). The hazard function, which gives the conditional (on t) probability of
exit, is given by
h(t)=P(T = t | T ≥ t), t=1,2,...k-1
and the survivor function, which gives the probability of staying in the same state










where S(t|xi) gives the probability that individual i with covariates xi will survive
up to time t,a n dS0(t)denotes the baseline survivor function (that is, where the
covariates equal zero). Given the relationship between the hazard and the survivor
functions with discrete time, one can write
1 − h(t|xi)=[ 1− h0(t)]
exp(x 
iβ),
which leads the cloglog hazard function
h(t|xi)=1− [1 − h0(t)]
exp(x 
iβ).
4The baseline hazard function may then be parameterized using diﬀerent func-
tional forms (piecewise-constant, polynomial, logarithmic, etc.). The regression
coeﬃcients may be interpreted as in standard proportional hazards models. The
model can be estimated straightforwardly transforming the duration data into bi-
nary outcomes, a procedure known as episode splitting. Fitting a generalized linear
model with binomial error and complementary log-log link, leads to the following









where ci identiﬁes a complete spell of unemployment.
3.2 The binomial-mixture duration model
We generalize our model to accommodate the presence of unobserved individual
heterogeneity. Unobserved individual heterogeneity may stem from omitted (or
unobserved) covariates and/or measurement errors in duration. Here we will con-
sider a simple model where we assume that two groups of individuals, in unknown
proportions, are present in the data. The diﬀerence among the two groups stands
from distinct intercepts. The group with the larger intercept (the hares) will leave
unemployment at a faster rate than the group with the smaller intercept (the tur-
tles). Formalizing this reasoning, we assume that the hazard function for a fraction
π of individuals is deﬁned as
h1(t|xi)=1− [1 − h0(t)]
exp(β0+β1x1i+...+βkxki),
while that of the remaining fraction of 1 − π can be written
h2(t|xi)=1− [1 − h0(t)]
exp(β0+δ+β1x1i+...+βkxki).
In this speciﬁcation the contribution to the likelihood function of individual i is
















53.3 The split-population model
We will now account for the possibility that there are some unemployedindividuals
who may never ﬁnd a job. Up to now we have neglected the existence of long-term
survivors (or inﬁnite durations). This approach has been used in the econometric
literature in the context a split-population framework for a single risk (Schmidt
and Witte, 1989) while Addison and Portugal (2003) oﬀer a generalization of the
split-population model to independent competing risks.3
To incorporate the possibility of “defective” risks we redeﬁne the survival func-
tion (which represents the proportion of unemployed who not ﬁnd a suitable job
until t)a s˜ S(t)=( 1− p)+pS(t)w h e r ep is the proportion of unemployed who
are indeed ”susceptible” to the risk of failure. The survival probability is, there-
fore, given by the proportion of long-term survivors (1 − p) who do not exit into
employment with probability 1, plus the proportion of ”susceptible” individuals,
p, multiplied by their corresponding probability of remaining unemployed until t,
S(t).
In order to guarantee that each p lies between zero and one, the logit repa-
rameterization for p = exp(μ)/(1 + exp(μ)) was employed. This has no other
consequence, in terms of ﬁnding evidence of long-term survivors, since it does not
preclude p from being as close to one (or zero) as needed. In this setup, the
contribution of observation i to the likelihood function is










Results of ﬁtting the proportional hazards model to the discrete duration data (the
complementary log-log model) are presented in Table 1. From the ﬁrst column of
the table it can be seen that receipt of unemploymentbeneﬁts depresses transitions
into employment by no less than 52 percent compared with nonrecipients. The
YOUNG variable appears to depress transition rates somewhat but only before
3These models are called “cure-rate” or long-term survival models in biostatistics.
6beneﬁts are actually drawn. Once drawn, those in receipt of three months shorter
beneﬁts actually have 65 percent higher escape rates than their nearest neighbours.
(Table 1 near here)
Including jobless duration as a regressor (shown in the second column of the
table) renders this eﬀect of beneﬁt duration largely unchanged while suggesting
negative duration dependence in the data. Speciﬁcally, a 10 percent increase in
elapsed duration at survey date is associated with a 2 percent reduction in escape
rates over the following three months.
The introduction of six age dummies (recall that the reference category is the
age “pair” 24 to 25 years of age), shown in the third column of the table, captures
the pure eﬀects of age on duration of joblessness. Familiarly, these age eﬀects
broadly indicate that escape rates decline strongly with age.4 The inclusion of the
age dummies serves to reduce the eﬀect of beneﬁt receipt on joblessness and in-
crease the coeﬃcient for the interaction term (i.e. increase hazard rates for shorter
maximum potential beneﬁts). Neglecting to take age eﬀects into account also ap-
parently modestly understates the indication of negative duration dependence in
the data.
In the ﬁnal column of the table, we include controls for number of years of
schooling, the unemployment rate, and dummies for marital status and physical
handicap. It is clear that the other coeﬃcient estimates are largely unaﬀected. The
principal exception is the coeﬃcient estimate for elapsed duration, which points
to a further strengthening of negative duration dependence.
At this stage, then, we have obtained strong evidence of the eﬀect of length
of beneﬁts on jobless duration by exploiting natural diﬀerences in the Portuguese
beneﬁts regime across nearly matched individuals in a framework that also identi-
ﬁes the pure eﬀects of age on transitions. We have reported that beneﬁt recipients
having three months shorter potential maximum beneﬁts have quarterly hazard
4The regression coeﬃcient estimates were -0.181, -0.647, -0.416, -0.415, -1.415, and -1.080, for the diﬀerent age
categories (29 and 30 years, 34 and 35 years, 39 and 40 years, 44 and 45 years, 49 and 50 years, and 54 and 55
years, respectively).
7rates that are 58 to 72 percent higher,cet.par. Moreover, the eﬀects of simple
beneﬁt receipt are in line with other estimates for Portugal (e.g. Portugal and
Addison, 2003).
(Table 2 near here)
But ceteris may not be paribus. In particular, despite the closeness of ad-
jacent individuals, unobserved individual heterogeneity may still cast a shadow.
Accordingly, in Table 2 we provide estimates for a two mass point hazard model.
The heterogeneity we identify is that between more employable individuals (call
them ’hares’) and less employable individuals (“turtles”). Thus, for example, if
we consider the results for the size of the mass points in the ﬁrst column of the
table it is apparent that the turtles have a base chance of ﬁnding work of 0.684
percent as compared with 20.36 percent for the hares. Note that these intercepts
are computed as 1 −exp(−exp(−4.982))and 1−exp(−exp(−1.480)), respectively.
Continuing with the other results in the ﬁrst column of Table 2 the eﬀects of
beneﬁt receipt are substantial, leading to a 78.6 percent fall in the hazard relative
to nonrecipients. These are much higher estimates than were reported in Table
1 and so, too, are the positive eﬀects of shorter maximum beneﬁt duration on
escape rates into employment: three months fewer maximum beneﬁts translate
into a doubling of escape rates. The results in the second column of the table
indicate that that adding in elapsed duration does not materially alter any of the
results; for example, the ﬁndings for the slow movers (turtles) and fast movers
(hares) are virtually unchanged at 0.729 percent and 20.7 percent, respectively. In
this speciﬁcation, the proportion of less-employable workers (turtles) is very large,
corresponding to around 85 percent of the unemployed population.
From column (3), the introduction of the age dummies, controlling for the
pure eﬀect of age on joblessness, has four main eﬀects. First, there is a major
diminution in the eﬀect of beneﬁt receipt on jobless, which value is in line with
the corresponding estimates in Table 1. Second, there is also a (more modest)
reduction in the eﬀects of shorter beneﬁts once drawn on escape rates. These are
8approximately 72 percent, again much in line with the ﬁndings in Table 1. Third
the eﬀect of elapsed duration is now both negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
which can be interpreted as indicating true duration dependence. Fourth, the
young hares (the 24 and 25 year olds) have a base hazard rate of a little under 9
percent, while for turtles the escape rate is just 0.00018 percent. The proportion of
less-employable workers (turtles) is now much smaller, corresponding to around 44
percent of the unemployed population. Adding in demographic controls and the
unemployment rate in the fourth column of the table leaves the previous results
largely unaltered, with the main change being a yet ﬁrmer indication of negative
duration dependence.
(Table 3 near here)
As a ﬁnal exercise, we exploit the suggestion of the two mass point hazard
model (especially from the last two columns of Table 2) that the escape rates of
an important subset of the sample - the turtles - are virtually zero. That is to say,
in Table 3 we provide results for a more parsimonious split-population model that
imposes the restriction that some escape rates are indeed zero or, equivalently,
that some jobless durations are inﬁnite (see Addison and Portugal, 2003). All
the regression coeﬃcient estimates thus now refer to the susceptible individuals.
Focusing here on the results for the full speciﬁcation contained in the last column
of Table 3, we see that the base chance of transitioning into employment over
a three-month period is a little over 10 percent for individuals in the reference
category (25 year old nonrecipients, etc.) among those who will eventually ﬁnd
employment. These movers make up a little less than one-half of the population,
meaning that for more than one-half of the population unemployment duration will
be inﬁnite.5 Not surprisingly the coeﬃcient estimates identical to those displayed
in Table 2. Receipt of beneﬁts that are three months shorter in maximum duration
than those of adjacent individuals results in higher escape rates into employment
of 87 percent.
5The indication of a signiﬁcant fraction of long-term unemployed - that is, of defective risks - is in line with
the results presented in Addison and Portugal (2003).
95 Conclusions
Typically, research points to much stronger disincentive eﬀects for increases in
maximum potential beneﬁts than for changes in replacement rates. In Portugal,
where replacementrates are virtuallya datum, we report potent disincentiveeﬀects
of longer beneﬁt duration. Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the fact that max-
imum potential unemployment beneﬁt duration is a deterministic function of age.
We report that, among UI recipients, three months shorter potential maximum
beneﬁts translate into 53 to 106 percent higher escape rates into employment, af-
ter controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, These results reinforce the
modern predisposition toward policy intervention that focuses more on duration
of beneﬁts than on replacement rates.
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12Table 1: Transitions into Employment, Complementary Log-Log Model   (n=35,368)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
UB -0.726 -0.843 -0.661 -0.694
(0.165) (0.165) (0.169) (0.170)
YOUNG -0.231 -0.189 -0.239 -0.218
(0.165) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
UB X YOUNG 0.501 0.455 0.540 0.531
(0.229) (0.229) (0.230) (0.230)




INTERCEPT -4.226 -3.332 -3.004 -3.069
(0.082) (0.113) (0.130) (0.137)
Log-likelihood -2152.66 -2104.6 -2070.7 -2063.4
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
Note: Specification (4) includes controls for schooling, marital status, handicap, and the unemployment rate
YES YES
YESTable 2: Transitions into Employment, Two-Mass Point Hazard Model   (n=35,368)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
UB -1.542 -1.527 -0.747 -0.833
(0.236) (0.269) (0.185) (0.170)
YOUNG -0.267 -0.266 -0.259 -0.276
(0.180) (0.178) (0.138) (0.118)
UB X YOUNG 0.723 0.719 0.584 0.625
(0.318) (0.318) (0.250) (0.230)




Intercept  for type 1 individuals -4.982 -4.917 -13.243 -10.509
(0.177) (0.352) (161.610) (0.177)
change in the intercept for type 2 individuals 3.502 3.458 10.841 8.171
(0.165) (0.328) (161.613) (0.165)
     
probability of being a type 1 individual 0.853 0.855 0.408 0.444
(0.023) (0.024) (0.117) (0.023)
probability of being a type 2 individual 0.147 0.145 0.592 0.555
(0.023) (0.024) (0.117) (0.023)
Log-likelihood -2100.4 -2099.1 -2069.5 -2061
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
Notes: See note to Table 1.
 
YES YES
YESTable 3: Transitions into Employment, Split Population Model   (n=35,368)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
UB -1.048 -0.929 -0.747 -0.833
0.192 (0.191) (0.185) (0.190)
YOUNG 0.040 -0.184 -0.258 -0.277
(0.160) (0.134) (0.138) (0.142)
UB X YOUNG 0.428 0.475 0.584 0.625
(0.177) (0.245) (0.250) (0.255)




INTERCEPT -2.857 -2.847 -2.402 -2.338
(0.125) (0.348) (0.270) (0.240)
     
probability that a transition is never made 0.620 0.385 0.408 0.445
(0.111) (0.207) (0.117) (0.079)
Log-likelihood -2120.2 -2104.2 -2069.5 -2061
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
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